How does information technology affect wages and organization? To answer this question, we model an economy formed by a continuum of agents with heterogeneous cognitive skill, who use a production technology that requires physical inputs and knowledge. Our model generates an assignment of workers to positions, a wage structure, and a universe of knowledge-based hierarchies with different allocations of tasks, spans of control, and number of layers. It displays positive sorting between production workers and problem solvers, an increasing relationship between rank and cognitive ability, an increasing and convex wage schedule and a positive relation between wages and firm size. We use our model to study the impact of information technology on the labor market and on the structure of firms. We show that the evolution of wage inequality and firm size is consistent with decreases in the cost of accessing information in the 80's and early 90's and decrease in the cost of communicating information in the late 90's. Our theory is also consistent with the evidence on decentralization, flatter hierarchies and larger spans of control.
Introduction
Knowledge is becoming cheaper to process, store and transmit. If the economic problem of society is, as Hayek (1945) argued, to use optimally the available knowledge, then such changes in the ability of individuals to process and transmit knowledge must impact both the organization of work and the rewards associated with knowledge-related skills. This paper presents a model of organizations formed by heterogeneous agents seeking to acquire the knowledge required for production and obtains the reward structure and organization associated with this goal. It shows that recent changes in labor markets and the internal structure of firms are best understood as consequences of reductions in the cost of accessing and communicating knowledge.
Empirical research has identified a broad pattern of changes in the labor market and in the organization of firms over the last two decades that we seek to explain here. In our view the internal organizational changes and their labor market counterparts must be understood as two sides of the same coin. Wages of individuals respond to the tasks they have been assigned, and these are in turn a consequence of their position in the hierarchy.
Conversely, an individual's position in the hierarchy depends on the wages individuals of different talents command 1 . between the two series is -0.877. This impressive negative correlation emphasizes our view that there is a common source of variation driving changes is both of them. In our interpretation this underlying source of variation are the cost of acquiring and communicating information. Our model is able to qualitatively reproduce these changes with exogenous improvements in database technology, mostly concentrated in the 80's and early 90's but present throughout the period, followed by improvements in communication technology (e.g. E-mail, Cell Phones and Wireless technology) in the late 90's. Some evidence of these improvements in information technology, and the particular timing described, is presented in Figure 2 . 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 1.00E-07
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Online Access (Percent of Population, LHS Scale) Several studies have documented the substantial increase in wage inequality in the 80's and early 90's which has been found to be mostly due to an increase in the demand for skill, 2 and, more specifically, for cognitive skills, 3 and which appears to be correlated with the increasing use of information technology. 4 Concerning the internal structure of organizations, recent work has documented, for the same period, an increase in the autonomy and responsibility of workers, a reduction of the number of layers of management, and an increase in the managerial span of control. Again, these changes have also been associated with the use of information technology. 5 Less studies are available for the late 90's, which makes it difficult to contrast the predictions of our theory with evidence on the internal reorganization of firms during this period. However, our theory provides empirical implications on decentralization, numbers of layers and spans of control for the second part of the 90's.
Even though our theory is consistent with the changes in total wage inequality illustrated in Figure 1 , it implies that the earnings of top entrepreneurs or managers relative to that of workers should increase throughout the 80's and 90's. This, since improvements in both information and communication technology lead to higher skill premia in equilibrium. We present evidence of this fact in Figure 3 . It shows the evolution of the average CEO total pay as a ratio of average worker pay from 1980 to 2000.
Our starting point to construct an equilibrium theory of organizations is the model of organizations in Garicano (2000) . He shows, in a model with homogeneous agents, that a 'knowledge-based hierarchy' is the efficient way to organize the acquisition of knowledge required for production when matching problems and solutions is costly. Agents choose to either learn how to perform the most common tasks and become production workers or 2 Katz and Murphy (1992) are the first paper to show that increases in inequality are consistent with skill biased technological change. Later, Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) and Dunne, Haltiwanger, and Troske (1996) have shown that the composition of the labor force within industry and establishments continues to shift towards the more educated workers and more skilled occupations, in spite of raises in returns to skills. Evidence that a similar patter is seen in other countries is provided by Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998) . 3 Murnane, Willet and Levy, (1995) find a higher correlation between earnings and test scores for a more recent panel of graduates than for an earlier one. This finding is particularly clear for high test scores in math. 4 It was Krueger (1993) who first documented a substantial premium associated with computer use, of up to half of the growth in the education premium since the eighties. This finding was confirmed later by Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1997) . Brynjolffson and Hitt (1997) and Lehr and Lichtenberg (1999) have found that larger computer purchases and skill are complementary. 5 Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) find, using firm-level data, that greater use of information technology is associated with the employment of more-educated workers, greater investments in training, broader job responsibilities for line workers, and more decentralized decision-making. Caroli and Reenen (2001) find evidence of organizational change complementary with increases in demand for skills. In particular, they find evidence of decentralization of authority and a widening of the range of tasks performed by workers. Rajan and Wulf (2002) , in a recent paper, present evidence that from 1986 to 1999 firms have become flatter, with less layers of management and that managerial span of control has increased. specialize in problem solving and transmit their knowledge about exceptional problems to production workers as needed. The role of the organization is to increase the utilization rate of the knowledge of most knowledgeable experts by shielding them from problems that less knowledgeable workers can solve equally well. Source: CEO sample is based on all CEOs included in the S&P 500, using data from Forbes and ExecuComp. CEO total pay includes cash pay, restricted stock, payouts from long-term pay programs, and the value of stock options granted using ExecuComp's modified Black-Scholes approach.
(Total pay prior to 1978 excludes option grants, while total pay between 1978 and 1991 is computed using the amounts realized from exercising stock options during the year, rather than grant-date values.) Worker pay represents 52 times the average weekly hours of production workers multiplied by the average hourly earnings, based on data from the Current Employment Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics. We thank Kevin Murphy for this data. In light of our position on the centrality of knowledge, the model puts squarely at the center of the analysis agent heterogeneity in cognitive skills. Agents with different cognitive ability must acquire knowledge and choose the job they want to perform (production or management/problem-solving). Workers who choose management jobs must choose the size of their teams and the tasks that team members must learn. The economy wide problem is an 'hedonic' equilibrium (Rosen, 1974) in which we obtain the earnings schedule and the full assignment of agents to teams 7 .
6 Clearly, hierarchies do much more than efficiently processes knowledge. In Section 2 we discuss some alternative theories.
7 Our focus on individual skill heterogeneity as the basis for organizational heterogeneity is consistent
The equilibrium displays three empirically interesting features that are worth anticipating here. First, it displays positive sorting, in the sense that higher ability agents answer questions from higher ability subordinates (production workers or lower level managers).
The reason is that the expertise of highly skilled managers must be shielded from easy questions.
Second, individuals in the economy are segmented by cognitive skill in the sense that the original continuous agent skill set will be partitioned in layers in a systematic way.
In particular, the lowest skill workers are production workers, the next workers are selfemployed entrepreneurs, the next are first level problem solvers in larger hierarchies, the next are entrepreneurs in two layer hierarchies, etc. Thus a unidimensional skill set and a common technology available to all workers, generate and economy formed by a universe of firms with different number of layers, different sizes, and different skill sets.
Third, the model is consistent with, and provides a rational for, a key unexplained stylized fact in the empirical literature on firms and wages: the large wage-size effect, whereby larger firms pay larger wages even after accounting for all of their differences (Brown and Medoff, 1989) . We show that this is a natural consequence of positive sorting:
in equilibrium, better agents are matched with better subordinates, who ask them questions less often. This allows better managers to have larger teams. This effect is amplified as the most skilled agents are assigned to higher ranked management roles. More layers and larger teams imply larger firms.
We then proceed to use the model to shed some light on the impact of information technology (IT) on wages and organization. with recent empirical work on the structure of wages. In particular, recent work using matched firm-worker data, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) find that 'virtually all of the interindustry wage differentials is accounted for by variation in average individual heterogeneity between sectors.' level management. This in turn implies an increase in the number of workers in the firm since entrepreneurs are shielded from a larger number of problems by next layer managers, and so the firm as a whole can deal with more problems. The impact of a reduction in the cost of communicating knowledge is similar, but the channel through which it operates is subtly different. A reduction in the cost of communicating knowledge leads teams to desire to expand their size (managers can deal with more questions), again resulting in an increase in the number of tasks performed by both entrepreneurs and high level managers.
The same reasoning as before then leads to an increase in the number of workers.
It is important to remark on the source of the skill technology complementarity. The marginal product of a worker/manager is proportional to the proportion of problems she knows how to deal with. Thus any technological change that increases the problems a worker deals with enhances the marginal value of her skill.
The paper goes on to consider the impact of these changes in equilibrium, when wages, assignments and the number of layers adjust. As we shall show, the feedback effects through wages lead teams to dampen their increase in the demand for workers at each level. As a result, decreases in the cost of communication lead teams to rely more on managers, reducing (rather than increasing) the decentralization of the organization. On the other hand the effect of reductions in the cost of accessing knowledge about tasks is unambiguously to increase the number of tasks performed, even if wages and the marginal price of skills go up.
Improvements in communication costs increase the maximum number of layers in the economy, since entrepreneurs can manage larger teams. Lower costs of information have an ambiguous effect. If communication costs are reasonably high the improvement in access to knowledge will lead to less layers, if communication costs are low, lower cost of information will lead to more layers. The reason is that improvements in the access to knowledge decrease the value of leveraging knowledge, but also the cost of extra layers since knowledge is cumulative. Improvements in both technologies will lead to less layers as long as improvements in access to information technology dominate improvements in communication technology.
Compared to the existing literature, the analysis we present in what follows is innovative in several dimensions. It is the first to study the equilibrium impact of IT on the acquisition and communication of knowledge. Second, it is the first to consider endogenously the assignments of jobs (managerial or productive) and tasks to heterogeneous agents in a hierarchy. Third, it allows us to jointly study the impact of information technology on the internal structure of firms and on the labor markets. Fourth, it does not 'black-box' the complementarity in the production function between skill demand and technology. Instead, it shows that this interaction is a natural consequence of the fact that improvements in technology for accessing knowledge (but not of communication technology) increase the range of problems that an individual worker can deal with. Thereby increasing the marginal value of each worker's ability.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses preexisting literature.
Section 3 presents the model, starting with the two layer case to facilitate its comprehension and then building on to the multiple layer case. Section 4 analyzes the partial equilibrium effect of technology (i.e. with wages, layers and assignments held constant) on organization and demand for skills. Section 5 constructs the equilibrium when wages, assignments and layers adjust, shows that it involves positive sorting, proves its existence, and characterizes the equilibrium. It also shows that an alternative, decentralized, version of the economy, where individuals shop for consulting services, is equivalent to the firm formulation. Finally, Section 6 studies the equilibrium impact of IT.
Understanding the Impact of IT: a review
A recent theoretical literature has studied the impact of technology on the labor market.
Acemoglu (1998) points out the important feed back effect between technical change and skills demand, and notes that an initial increase in the supply of skills would lead to 'directed' technical change complementary with these newly abundant skills, eventually possibly leading to increases in skill premia. Galor and Moav (2000) develop a theory that aims to explain why wage inequality has increased within skill levels (as measured by education attainment). The explanation relies on the observation that workers in a given skill category may have different abilities: low or high skilled labor are not treated as homogeneous inputs. Thus in their view ability-biased (and not skill biased) technological change may explain the increase in wage inequality within skill groups. Saint Paul (2000) also focuses on the impact of IT on the wage structure. He presents a (non-hierarchical) model of team formation and selection when there are spillovers between worker's skills. He considers the role of information technology as increasing the size of the population over which a worker's ideas can be spread in such a model. His main implication is that such improvements have an ambiguous impact on inequality. Inequality may actually fall, as creativity has also positive effects over production workers and large networks have more competition among creative people, which reduces the return to creativity.
Finally Mobius (2000) delivers, in a non-hierarchical model, implications for both the wage structure and the assignment of tasks, understood here as the extent of specialization, but not for the hierarchical layers or the spans of control. He aims to explain why the division of labor (specialization) was low in the "artisan economy", increased with the "machine economy" and then decreased again with the "new economy". The explanation has to do with the interaction between uncertainty and market size. Larger markets lead to increased mix of products, which in turn increases uncertainty due to fads and fashion and reduces specialization. The implications for the wage structure are derived under the extra auxiliary assumption that low skilled workers are less productive if not specialized. The pattern of wage inequality then is due to shifts in relative demand for skilled labor over time, when high-skilled labor is relatively more efficient than low-skilled under less specialization. While the existence of implications for specialization is an important contribution of the model, it does not deliver implications for span of control and for the occupational distribution of the labor force. Also, the model does not allow for the study of the impact of information technology on wages and specialization.
Thus none of the existing analysis of the impact of technology on the labor market contains a model of hierarchies permitting the analysis of the internal, within firm, implications of technological change. To achieve this, a model of the hierarchical structure of the firm needs to be embedded in an equilibrium model. Only Rosen (1982) does this, but his hierarchical model, which delivers hierarchies through the assumption of a generic multiplicative technology between managerial and worker skill, is not suitable for the study of the impact of IT on tasks and organization. Lucas (1978) also presents an equilibrium model of occupational choice but, again, without hierarchies.
The challenge then for the researcher trying to build an equilibrium theory of wages and positions is to embed a full fledged model of a hierarchy in an equilibrium framework. 8 We choose to do this taking Garicano (2000) as our starting point as it is the only one of those models that has an explicit concept of task assignment.
8 Apart from Garicano (2000) , three categories of models of hierarchies can be considered. One where the main role of managers is monitoring (Calvo and Weillisz, 1978 , 1979 and Qian 1994 . A second where hierarchies are information processors (Radner, 1992 , and Radner and van Zandt, 1992 , Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994 or resource allocators (Cremer, 1980, Geanakoplos and Milgrom, 1991) . A third, more recent strand (Rajan and Zingales 2001) studies the role of hierarchies in administering access to core resources.
The Model
We study a production process which requires production, time, and knowledge of the tasks that must be performed. Workers of heterogeneous ability learn to solve tasks and choose an occupation and a team to join. The available occupations are different layers of problem solving and production. All workers supply a unit of labor. The equilibrium allocation in the economy determines the wages for all agents, the tasks they perform, and the composition and structure of teams.
Production and Knowledge
A task is drawn per unit of time per worker. Production takes place when either the worker knows how to perform the task, or when she can ask someone else who knows. In the second case, workers incur communication or 'helping' time cost h. 9 Some tasks are known a priori to be more common than others. We rank the tasks by the likelihood they will be confronted, so that the Z task is associated with density f (Z), where f (Z) is decreasing.
A worker i can learn to perform tasks at a cost c i . Workers start learning the most frequent tasks first, and then move on to the less common ones, so that knowledge of more knowledgeable workers always encompasses the knowledge of the less knowledgeable ones.
That is, knowledge is cumulative. We say that a worker has acquired knowledge z i when she has learned to perform all tasks in (0, z i ).
The analysis in Garicano (2000) shows that, when matching problems and solutions is hard, the optimal organization of the acquisition of knowledge involves less knowledgeable workers learning about the most common problems and spending all their time in production and 'managers' specializing in solving problems and learning about increasingly more exceptional problems. This organization has a pyramidal structure, with each layer having a smaller number of workers than the previous layer.
Following this analysis, we take as our starting point an economy formed by individuals of heterogeneous cognitive skill that may join in teams (composed of managers and production workers). Managers are specialized in acquiring knowledge about tasks and in problem solving, and workers specialize in production and acquire knowledge only about the most common tasks. In this subsection we restrict our attention for simplicity to two layer organizations. After we explain the fundamental features of the production process we will introduce an arbitrary number of layers. The number of layers in the economy will be determined in equilibrium.
We can then write output produced by a team with n production workers who spend each 1 unit of time in production and acquire knowledge about tasks z p at a unit learning cost c p and a manager who acquires knowledge z m > z p at a cost c m as:
Subject to a time constraint on the manager. The manager spends a fraction of time h helping each one of n workers in the team whenever they cannot perform a task, which happens with probability 1 − F (z p ). Workers do not spend time asking questions. The constraint is then: 10
Notice that we are assuming that managers spend time answering questions even if they do not know the answer. The time constraint implies that the span of the manager is limited by the knowledge of the production workers; if production workers acquire more knowledge, they will require help less often, and managers will be able to supervise larger teams.
Occupational Choice and the Skills Supply
Agents are heterogeneous in their cognitive ability. But ability does not have a natural scale. We define (and scale) from now on ability as follows. Measure the cost for each i worker of learning to perform an interval of tasks of unit length z = 1 in units of foregone output, and call this cost c i . Call the ability of the worker with the highest measured cost α = 1 and the ability of the worker with the lowest cost α = 0. We can then draw a straight line between these points with intercepts t and slope k, and assign ability α i from this line to the rest of the workers depending on their cost of acquiring knowledge. This method results in an implicit definition of ability in this world so that a doubling in the ability of a worker results in a proportionate reduction in the cost of learning a given interval of problems. We then write the cost function as a function of ability:
There are two technological parameters in this function: t and k. Both of them represent the state of information technology, i.e. a technology that decreases the cost of learning to find the solution to a given problem. In what follows, we do not assume a priori that the technological change favors more skilled workers, and center the analysis on changes in t.
We can induce, following the procedure above, from the exogenous distribution of learning costs in the population, a distribution of cognitive abilities with support [0, 1]. We assume that this distribution can be described by a continuous density function, α ∼ φ(α).
Finally, we assume that no substantial heterogeneity exists in communication skills among workers. 11
Agents are income maximizers. The agent's problem is to choose her occupation to maximize income, given the earnings schedule. Namely, the problem of an agent endowed with skill α is given by:
The second term in (3), w(α), is the market wage for an agent of skill α hired as a worker. The first term Π(α) is the managerial income earned by the worker if she chooses to go into management. The calculation of this income requires solving the manager problem, obtaining the market wage for all workers, and finding out which workers are assigned to him in equilibrium. This is the object of the next sections.
Managers and the Demand for Skills
Consider now the problem of a worker of skill α m who chooses to go into management and hires a team of n production workers of skill α p . The manager chooses the number of workers hired, the interval of tasks he learns, and the production worker's knowledge, given wages, to maximize his residual (after labor costs) rent: 12
subject to the time constraint of the manager:
It will simplify the discussion to define the proportion of tasks that a worker or manager can perform as
Replacing the constraint into the objective of the manager (4), and using this new notation, the problem becomes:
The model with multiple layers
We want to use the model to give us predictions about the number of layers in a firm, and to analyze how the structure of firms affects wages and earnings. For this purpose, we now generalize the production process introduced in the previous subsections to allow agents to join into team with multiple layers of managers. Agents will choose between becoming entrepreneurs (top level managers), managers of intermediate layers, or workers. We analyze the problem of an entrepreneur that maximizes rents, given wages and assignments, and can hire different layers of managers and workers. Consider the problem of an entrepreneur of layer + 1 with skill α +1 managing a firm of + 1 layers, with managers of ability α l (l = 1, ..., ) and workers of ability α 0 , with wages w l (l = 0, ..., ). The entrepreneur chooses the number of managers/workers at all layers and their knowledge levels to solve the following problem:
subject to
and
The first set of constraints are time constraints for the different layers of managers and the top level entrepreneurs. The last constraint says that higher layer managers must have more knowledge than lower layer managers. This is a convention in our notation. The rest of this section we will transforms this problem to rewrite it in a convenient recursive form.
The problem above can be broken down in two parts. The first part is the problem of the entrepreneur, given that all lower layers of management behave optimally. The second part, that we discuss next, is the problem of managers. Managers of layer l maximize the value per worker of an l-layer branch of the firm given their own knowledge, wages (including their wage) and assignments. Let α ≡ (α , ..., α 0 ) and w ≡ (w , ..., w 0 ), then we can denote the value per worker of an −layer branch recursively by
= max
That is, the top manager of the branch is choosing the knowledge (and therefore the number of managers per worker) of all managers and workers in the branch, given her knowledge, wages, and assignments. Or, equivalently, he is choosing the knowledge of the manager/worker one layer below him and he is letting all lower level managers choose the knowledge of their subordinates. Notice that the number of workers in the firm is not chosen by intermediate managers, they only choose the number of lower layer managers per worker by deciding the knowledge of their immediate subordinates.
The first order condition for the problem above is given by
with equality iff
The first order condition equates the marginal cost and marginal benefit of increasing the knowledge of the lower layer management. The marginal cost is the decrease in the contribution to output of the branch top manager. The marginal benefits is the decrease in the knowledge and wage costs (monetary costs of time) spent on solving problems at the top layer of the branch, and the increase in the value of layer −1 branches.
The derivative of the value of the branch with respect to the knowledge of its highest layer manager (the envelope condition) is given by
for an internal solution (Q > Q −1 M ). That is, the change in the value per worker of a branch when we change the knowledge of its top manager has two components. On one hand, the gain in branch's output resulting from the ability of its top managers to solve more problems. On the other, the increase in the learning cost per worker of the top manager.
Combining, the first order and envelop condition we obtain,
with equality iff The original problem in (7) can then be rewritten as
for ≥ 0 and
Summarizing, we can interpret the multilayer problem as follows: An entrepreneur of layer + 1 with skill α +1 hires managers of layer with knowledge Q at wage w per managed worker. Entrepreneurs decide on their own knowledge and the knowledge of managers/workers immediately below them. The managers of the th layer in turn manage the remaining -layers of the firm given their knowledge Q. These -layers are worth p (Q; α , w ) per worker managed for the firm.
The first order conditions of problem (12) are given by
where both equations hold with equality iff 1 ≥ Q +1 E ≥ Q E ≥ 0. The first weak inequality (≥) in equation (13) (14), the first weak inequality (≤) in equation (13) 
The interpretation of (14) is similar to the one of condition (9), entrepreneurs choose the knowledge of lower layer management to balance the loss in output associated with problems that they solve, with the gains in the value of branches of the firm and the monetary costs of the time they save. One could combine (14) with the envelope condition in (10) to obtain a condition that equates the gain associated with the time saved by the entrepreneur and the marginal learning cost of increasing the knowledge of lower management. Condition 
Comparative Statics
We characterize here the partial equilibrium impact of access to information and communication technology on knowledge, task assignment and managerial spans. We identify an organization as more decentralized if managers are needed 'less often' in the production process.
The following proposition shows that the knowledge of entrepreneur and next layer managers/workers increases with improvements in communication and access to information technology. Consider first the effect of an increase in the information at the disposal of agents decreasing the cost of learning to perform a task. Because of the decrease in the costs, entrepreneurs and managers learn more. Intuitively, the organization becomes more decentralized, as agents in the lower level are able to deal with more tasks on their own and require less assistance of entrepreneurs. Now consider the case of a reduction in communication costs. Lower communication costs implies an increase in the number of agents that entrepreneurs can solve problems for.
These result implies a higher value of knowledge that leads to an increase in the knowledge acquired by entrepreneurs. The increase in the knowledge of entrepreneurs in turn increases the value of knowledge of lower level manager or workers which in turn leads to an increase in the knowledge acquired by lower level managers or workers. Notice that there is another effect that we have not emphasized. As communication costs go down and entrepreneurs can solve more problems, the value of agents knowledge, that has the sole value of reducing the number of questions to the entrepreneur, goes down. However, the increase in the amount of knowledge acquired by the entrepreneur increases the value of the knowledge of managers/workers enough so that the second effect never dominates the first one. The formal result is presented in the next proposition. The proofs of all propositions in this section are in the appendix.
Proposition 1 Given wages, assignments, and the equilibrium maximum number of layers, the knowledge of entrepreneurs and next layer managers/workers increases with improvements in communication and access to information technology. That is, Q l+1 E and Q l E are decreasing in t and h for all layers l = 0, ..., − 1.
A similar proposition can not be proven for the case of intermediate managers and workers. The effect on their knowledge of improvements in the access to information and communication technology is uncertain. Given the knowledge of their boss, as the availability of information increases the monetary costs of their boss's time decreases, since acquiring knowledge is less costly for the boss. The value of the workers knowledge, which is the result of saving the manager time, also decreases. This implies that, given the boss's knowledge, the knowledge acquired by the intermediate manager/worker decreases. On top of this effect, we know that the boss will learn how to solve more problems, which in turn increases intermediate manager/worker productivity. These two effects go in opposite direction and it is not possible to prove in general that one will dominate the other.
As communication technology improves, entrepreneurs and managers can solve problems for more agents, which results in a decrease in the value of their time given their knowledge.
This implies a decrease in the number of problems learned by middle management and workers, given the knowledge of their boss. Again we have the effect of more knowledge learned by entrepreneurs and next layer managers that implies an increase in the productivity of the knowledge of these agents. We prove these two effects separately in the next two propositions.
Proposition 2 Given wages, assignments, and the equilibrium maximum number of layers, the knowledge of intermediate managers and workers increases with the knowledge of managers/entrepreneurs directly above them. That is, Q l M is a strictly increasing function of Q l+1 for all layers l = 0, ..., − 2.
Proposition 3 Given wages, assignments, and the equilibrium maximum number of layers, the knowledge of intermediate managers and workers decreases with improvements in the access to information and communication technology. That is, Q l M is a decreasing function of t and h given Q l+1 for all layers l = 0, ..., − 2.
We now turn to the effect of access to information and communication technology on the span of control. In order to analyze the effect of access to information technology on the spans of control in all the knowledge hierarchy we would need to know how all levels of knowledge change relative to each other. However, as we mentioned above, the sign of the effect of changes in access to information and communication technology on the knowledge of intermediate managers and workers is ambiguous. Given this, we can not make general statements about the span of control of each layer of management, namely statements about
It is possible, however, to determine how the average span of control of entrepreneurs (measured by the number of workers in the firm) will change with improvements in the access to information and communication technology. To understand the claim that the number of workers has an interpretation as the average span of control, notice that
and so the number of workers is the geometric mean of the span of control at all layers.
An increase in the availability of information will lead to an increase in the knowledge of entrepreneurs and next layer managers as we showed above. This implies that the entrepreneur will have to answer less problems and so will be able to manage a larger firm.
The same is true for decreases in communication costs, since the new technology will imply more knowledge of next layer managers/workers. However, in the case of communication technology we have another effect, since the improvements has a direct effect on the number of problems that entrepreneurs can solve. Both effects increase the number of workers in the firm. We present these results formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Given wages, assignments, and the equilibrium maximum number of layers, the average span of control of entrepreneurs increases with improvements in the access to information and communication technology. That is, in a firm with l + 1 layers,
is increasing in t and h.
Equilibrium
The previous analysis has allowed us to obtain, for a given hierarchy, the proportion of tasks each agent should learn to perform, and team sizes 13 . This section solves for the assignment of workers to jobs, the wage schedule that supports this assignment, and the number of layers of each hierarchy 14 .
Let Q l (α l ) be the equilibrium knowledge of an agent with ability α l , w l ¡ α l ¢ her wage, and let a l (α l ) be the equilibrium ability of a entrepreneur/manager of layer l + 1 that manages an agent with ability α l . That is, the function a l assigns the ability of a manager/worker to the entrepreneur/manager one layer above. Fix a layer l and define the vector of assignments of all lower level abilities as a function of the ability of the entrepreneur/manager of layer l (l = 1, ..., ) by (abusing notation)
Similarly, denote the vector of wages as a function of the ability of the layer l manager by
The two vectors described above will help us define the value of a branch and the rents of the firm as a function of the ability of the entrepreneur. So define the equilibrium value of 13 We will talk about workers, managers and entrepreneurs for simplicity; clearly, these are measure 0 atoms in a continuous distribution. The only appropriate way to think about them are masses of workers and managers at given intervals. The reader should thus not read from the existence of the assignment function that teams are homogeneous. Instead, any mass of workers may be matched with managers, depending on the shape of the skill distribution.
14 Note that the problem we confront is different from Sattinger (1993) and Teulings (1995) (and all other) canonical ('Ricardian') assignment problems. First, rather than matching one worker and one machine, we match here one manager and any number of workers. Second, our economy must not assign given machines to given workers; we have instead to determine which workers are going chose to be managers and which one to be production worker. Third, the interaction between manager skill and worker skill is not direct, but takes place, as we shall see, through the team size and the knowledge acquired. In short, having smarter workers allows a manager to have a larger team, as they ask less often; but in turn, this requires a smarter manager, as the questions smarter workers ask are less common. a branch per worker by
for ≥ 1 and
We can also define the rents of a hierarchy by
for ≥ 1 and R 0 * * (α 0 ) ≡ R 0 (α 0 ).
In order for the function a l to be well defined and invertible, we need the assignment to be singled valued and monotone. We prove that this is in fact the case at the end of this section.
The definition of equilibrium in this setup is given by:
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium is
• an integer maximum number of layers ,
• a collection of sets
such that for α ∈ A lM agents choose to be members of management layer l, l = 1, ..., , workers for α ∈ A 0M , and entrepreneurs of layer l for α ∈ A lE , l = 0, ..., ,
• a wage w l (α l ) : A lM → R + , for managers of layers l = 1, ..., and workers, l = 0,
• an earnings function of entrepreneurs R l * (α l ) :
• a collection of assignment functions a l (α l ) :
• and a vector of firm's choices (Q , ..., Q 0 , n , ..., n 0 ), such that:
(i) Agents occupational choice is optimal given wages and managerial income, that is, agents's utility is given by
(ii) Managers' choices solve the objective function (12) for all layers and the number of managers and workers satisfies
(iii) The wage schedule is such that the assignment α l = a l−1 (α l−1 ) is optimal for the manager or entrepreneur of layer l, i.e., the value of the branch per worker managed defined in (8) and (15) or of the firm defined in (16) satisfies for α lM ∈ A lM and for α lE ∈ A lE ,
and the second order condition is satisfied.
(iv) The market for production workers and managers at all layers clears: at every point α l ∈ A l the number of workers (l = 0) or managers ( > l > 0) that are supplied is equal to the number of workers or managers demanded:
for all α l ∈ A l and l = 0, ..., − 1.
An important characteristic of the equilibrium, greatly simplifies its structure: the assignment involves positive sorting, in the sense that better managers are matched with better employees. That is, the assignment functions are strictly increasing. We prove this result in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 An equilibrium of this economy involves positive sorting.
High ability managers hire high ability agents so that they are shielded from solving easy and common problems. Hiring better workers allows managers to specialize in solving only the harder problems that lower layer agents can not solve. Proposition (5) confirms our assertion that the assignment functions were singled valued and monotone.
Assignment
We will assume that the collection of sets
is such that there exists a set of real numbers
Different collections of sets may be an equilibrium too. That is, there may be multiple layers of firms not only multiple layers in a firm. However, we prove below that an equilibrium with these characteristics exists.
Conditions (18) and (20) in the definition of equilibrium imply that
for l > 0 and
As an example, suppose that we are assigning managers to workers. Then, the number of managers per subordinate worker that results from the firm optimization, over the ratio of available agents with the corresponding ability, determines the slope of the assignment function. These are ordinary differential equations that determine the functions a l given some initial values. The boundary conditions, are given by
for l = 1, ..., − 1. Naturally, the boundaries between the abilities of the different occupations of agents, © α * ll , α * ll+1 ª l=0 , are determined in equilibrium. We will go over the exact construction of an equilibrium below.
Wages and earnings
Condition (17) in the definition of equilibrium requires that agents choose optimally to become workers, managers or entrepreneurs, and the layer of management or entrepreneurship.
This implies that, for l = 0, ..., ,
and, for l = 0, ..., − 1,
These conditions mean that at the boundaries that separate the ability sets of managers/ workers and entrepreneurs, and at the boundaries that separate the ability sets of entrepreneurs one layer below and managers, earnings have to equate. That is, the earnings function is continuous. Clearly this is the case within occupations, however, we need to argue that it is also the case at the boundaries between occupations. Suppose the earnings function was not continuous, then agents with abilities arbitrarily close to the boundary would profit from changing profession and so the allocation would not be an equilibrium by condition (17).
The definition of equilibrium requires the optimal assignment of workers and managers at different layers to be optimal. Condition (19) implies that if α l is a manager of layer l,
If α l is an entrepreneur of layer l,
The slope of the entrepreneurs earning function can be determined using (12). Namely,
Remember that g(Q) ≡ z, i.e. it represents the interval of tasks that a worker must learn. In words, the condition means that the marginal return to skill is the marginal value of production workers skill, which is given by the knowledge the worker must acquire.
This equation contains a lot of the intuition of what follows. More inequality will result in equilibrium whenever a technology change leads production workers to learn more tasks, as then the difference between more and less skilled workers becomes more pronounced.
By definition of multiple layers, Q l+1 (α * ll+1 ) ≥ Q l (α * ll+1 ), and by Proposition 7 (See Section 5.3), the equilibrium amount of knowledge is increasing in ability, all l = 0, ..., − 1.
That is, managers and entrepreneurs in higher layers know how to solve more rare and difficult problems and their knowledge increases with ability. Hence, since g is increasing,
for all l = 0, ..., − 1. Similarly, for α ∈ A lE andᾱ ∈ A l+1M , ∂R l * (α)
Define the equilibrium earnings function as
Then, the above discussion implies that, if the earnings function is convex within a class, the whole earnings function is increasing and convex in ability. That means that wages grow faster than the ability of individuals. Smarter workers not only have lower cost of learning, but also learn more. Moreover, smarter workers are in higher layers and have larger teams below them. We prove these properties of the earnings function in the following proposition.
Proposition 6
The equilibrium earnings function is increasing and convex.
Consultant services formulation
In this section we will present an alternative formulation of the economy described above.
This formulation is not based on firms but on consultants. Workers produce. When they face a problem that they do not know how to solve, they may ask a consultant that specializes in solving hard problems. Some consultants are first layer consultants, their fee is low so workers first go to ask them. If they do not know the solution to the problem, workers may go to a higher layer consultant that charges another fee for trying to solve the problem. The number of layers of consultants will be determined in equilibrium. We will show at the end of this section that this formulation is equivalent to the one with firms. The formulation is useful both for interpretation purposes and to derive some of the results.
Consider the problem of a worker of skill α 0 that hires consultants to solve problems for them. She can hire consultants sequentially if the previous consultant was not able to solve the problem. The fee for asking a consultant with knowledge Q is denoted by f (Q). If we let w 0 (α 0 ; f ) be the earnings of a worker of skill α 0 given a function of fees f , the problem of the worker is given by:
where is the maximum number of layers of consultants that the worker will ask for advice.
This integer is determined by comparing the optimal value for the worker with or without asking another consultant. A simpler condition is that a worker will consult layers of consultants only if
For an unanswered question to be posted to the next layer, the conditional probability of finding the solution in that layer, must be higher or equal than the fee. As we increase by one, on one hand the extra knowledge acquired by consultants of layer + 1 is highly leveraged since they can promise to answer questions for many workers. The reason is that many problems will be solved before they reach them. On the other hand, these consultants have the knowledge to solve all the problems that do not reach them. They, however, never use the knowledge that lower level consultants also have. In this sense, the acquisition of knowledge is duplicated and this is costly. The trade-off between the two forces determines the number of layers both in this and the previous formulation of the economy.
The first order conditions of the problem are given by
These equations implicitly define the demand for knowledge of layer l consultants of a worker with skill α 0 , Q ID (α 0 ).
The problem of a consultant is to choose a knowledge level so as to maximize the fees he receives. Hence the problem of a consultant with skills α I is given by
The first order condition of the problem is then given by
Hence, we denote by Q S (α) the supply of knowledge of a consultant with skills α and £ Q S ¤ −1 (Q) the inverse function. The latter exists since Q S (α) is a strictly increasing function (see Proposition (7) below). Using the inverse function, we can define an assignment function a l that assigns consultants of layer l to workers. In particular,
Proposition 7 Q S is a strictly increasing function of α.
Proposition 8 Q S is strictly decreasing in t and h.
We are ready to define an equilibrium in this economy:
Definition 2 A competitive equilibrium is
• a collection of sets © A l ª l=0 such that for α ∈ A l agents choose to be consultants of layer l, l = 1, ..., , and workers for α ∈ A 0 , a rent function R for consultants and a wage function w 0 for workers; a fee function f (Q),
• an assignment function a l for each layer of consultant, l = 1, ..., ,
• and a function of knowledge choices (Q , ..., Q 0 ), such that:
(i) Agents occupational choice is optimal given wages and managerial income, that is, it satisfies
(ii) Consultant' choices solve the objective function (34);
(iii) Workers' choices solve the objective function (29) (v) Supply and demand of problem solutions equates for all layers of consultants, l = 1, ..., . That is, for all
We now prove that both formulations of the problem are equivalent.
Proposition 9
The set of equilibria in the economy presented in Section 3.4 is identical to the set of equilibria in the economy presented in Section 5.3. That is, both formulations are equivalent.
Existence and characterization of an equilibrium
The next proposition shows that there exists an equilibrium with the characteristics described. That is, there exist an equilibrium where agents sort according to skill. The lowest skill agents become workers and higher skill agents, that become managers or entrepreneurs, work at a higher layer the higher their skill.
Before we present the proposition, it is useful to outline the algorithm to find an equilibrium in this economy. An equilibrium can be constructed as follows:
1. Set = 0 and fix α * 00 = 0, α * 01 = 1 and w 0 (0) = R 0 * (0).
2. We can calculate R 0 * (α), all α ∈ [0, 1] , and, given w 0 (0), R 1 * * (1, 0). Compare R 0 * (1)
the allocation is an equilibrium and = 0. If
> 0, proceed to 3.
3. Set = 1 and fix α * 00 > 0, α * 01 , α * 11 , α * 12 = 1 and w 0 (0) > R 0 * (0).
4. Given w 0 (0) we can calculate w 0 (α) for all α ∈ £ 0, α * 00 ¤ and R 0 * (α) for all α ∈ £ α * 00 , α * 01 ¤ . Find α * 00 such that w 0 (α * 00 ) = R 0 * (α * 00 ). 6. Compare R 0 * (α * 01 ) with R 1 * (α * 01 ). Find w 0 (0) such that
Let the supply of workers accumulated in the interval
Compare R 1 * (1) with R 2 * (1). If
= 1 and we have found an equilibrium. If
> 1 so proceed as in 3. but with = 2. Proposition 10 There exists an equilibrium allocation with the property that, for some vector of thresholds (0, α * 00 , α * 01 , α * 11 , ..., α * , 1), agents with ability α ∈ £ 0, α * 00 ¤ choose to become workers, agents with ability α ∈ £ α * ll , α * ll+1 ¤ choose to become entrepreneurs of layer l, l = 0, ..., with α * +1 = 1, and agents with ability α ∈ £ α * l−1l , α * ll ¤ choose to become managers of layer l, l = 1, ..., . Furthermore, the last layer in the economy ( ), consists only of entrepreneurs. That is, α * −1 = α * .
So far we have studied the model without reference to the efficiency properties of the equilibrium allocation. Since the total time endowment of agents is allocated, and the problems that are not eventually solved would be more costly to solve than the benefits that agents may derive from solving them, there is no reason to believe that the equilibrium allocation of this economy is not efficient. However, the possibility of multiple equilibria introduces the concern that some of the equilibrium allocations may not be global optima.
In the next proposition we prove that the equilibrium with the properties described in
Proposition (10) is the global optimum of a constrained set of allocations.
Proposition 11
The equilibrium allocation that is guaranteed to exist by Proposition (10) is a global optimum in the set of allocations characterized by arbitrary thresholds (0, α 00 , α 01 , α 11 , ..., α , 1).
We end this section with a result on the size of hierarchies, or the average span of control of entrepreneurs, and how it relates to wages. In equilibrium, higher ability agents are matched with better subordinates and they are assigned to higher ranked positions.
This implies that wages in larger firms are larger than in smaller firms. Namely:
Proposition 12 In equilibrium, larger firms, measured by number of workers, pay higher wages.
The Effect of Changes in the Technology to Access and Communicate Information
This section analyzes the evidence discussed in the introduction in the light of the predictions of the model. We argue that a decrease in the cost of accessing information lead to the changes in the wage structure and organization of production observed in the 80's and early 90's. These improvements in information technology also resulted in the increases in decentralization and spans of control, and in the delayering of firms, identified by the empirical literature. We also claim that further changes in the cost of accessing information, together with important decreases in the cost of communicating information in the mid and late 90's, lead to a stable first, and then slightly decreasing wage inequality, accompanied by a first stable, and then slightly increasing, average firm size. This latter change in communication technology has other implications on organization that, as far as we know, have not been tested in the empirical literature. In particular, according to our theory, it should have caused an increase in spans of control, constant or slightly decreasing decentralization, and constant or slightly increasing number of layers.
To illustrate these qualitative predictions of the model and advance the characterization of an equilibrium allocation, we compute several numerical examples of the model. We will use these examples to explain the general equilibrium effects of both types of technological changes in our theory.
An Example with Exponential Problem Density
We study here a concrete example of the previous model with an exponential density of problems, f (z) = e −λz and a uniform distribution of worker talent, α ∼ U [0, 1]. Moreover, we let k = 1 and λ = 2 in all exercises. Figure The six graphs presented in Figure 5 show the equilibrium wage and knowledge of all agents for different parameter values. The figures in the first row present the earnings curves for h = 0.98, and t = 1.9 and 1.1 respectively. The second row presents earnings when we lower the value of h to 0.8 for the same values of t, and the third row shows the same exercise for h = 0.7. The parameter values have been chosen to maximize visibility.
There are several features of the equilibrium we have described above that are apparent in all of the figures presented. Wages are increasing and convex, higher ability agents learn more, and there is positive sorting. All of these are general results in our model and so should be present in all simulations. We now turn to the description of the effect of changes in communication and access to information technology.
The following table may be useful to understand the numerical results presented in the figures above and described in the two next subsections. 
Reduction in Communication Cost
In this subsection we analyze the equilibrium effect of reductions in communication costs (smaller h). As h decreases, the maximum number of layers in the economy increases. For h = 0.98 and t = 1.1 the economy has only workers that are self-employed. As we decrease h, keeping t constant, we move to an allocation with workers, a small number of self-employed agents, and managers/entrepreneurs. Even lower communication costs (h = 0.7) results in an allocation where the lowest ability agents are workers, higher ability agents are selfemployed, and there is one layer of managers and a layer of entrepreneurs. All these results are also apparent for the same h values but a higher t. We go from an allocation with workers, self-employed agents and managers/entrepreneurs to an allocation with workers and managers/entrepreneurs. We interpret this as a weak increase in the number of layers, since for low values of h all agents work in firms.
The maximum amount of knowledge acquired (the knowledge acquired by an agent with α = 1) increases with decreases in h. In contrast, the knowledge of the highest ability worker decreases. That is, lower communication costs imply less decentralization. The direct effect of h on spans of control dominates the decrease in decentralization, therefore yielding the larger span of control apparent in Table 1 . The lower h, the more can knowledge be leveraged so the higher the gains from an extra layer of managers. On the other hand, the cost of duplication -given by the fact that managers need to learn how to solve the problems that their subordinates solve -does not change. these results in more layers of management. Together, the increases in span of control and number of layers imply an increase in the size of hierarchies.
Wage inequality within the working class decreases as communication technology improves, since workers learn how to solve less problems. However, the higher leverage of knowledge, resulting in higher number of layers and higher span of control, implies more wage inequality within managers/entrepreneurs. These two effect are specially clear in Table 1 for the case of t = 1.1, for t = 1.9 workers do not learn, so there is no within group wage inequality. In fact, the decrease in worker wage inequality, combined with the increase in manager/entrepreneur wage inequality may result in some agents earning less after the improvement in communication costs. This is the case in Figure 6 when t = 1.1 and communication costs go from 0.8 to 0.7. The example shows how there may be some losers as technology improves! Total wage inequality, measured by the standard deviation of wages, first decreases and then increases as we decrease h. Decreases in h reduce blue collar wage inequality and increase white collar wage inequality. The first effect dominates for high levels of h and the second for low levels. Notice that the wage of the lowest ability agent increases as communication costs fall. The reason is that the higher span of control results in higher demand for workers, part of the effect is translated in higher wages for all workers and part as an increase in the ability of the best worker, thereby increasing the amount of workers.
Reduction in the cost of acquiring knowledge
Consider now an increase in information availability leading to a reduction in the cost of learning tasks. As Figures 5 and 6 and Table 1 show, the general equilibrium impact of the change is a substantial increase in wage inequality within groups (measure as the standard deviation of wages). Both workers and managers acquire more knowledge since it is cheaper (more decentralization). This implies a substantial increase in workers's and manager's wage inequality. That is, within class wage inequality increases (See Figure 6 ).
Since workers learn how to solve more problems, their wage increases as well. This effect is emphasized since knowledgeable workers ask less questions to managers and so managers can increase their span of control (see Table 1 ). This in turn increases the demand for workers and therefore their wage. However, the gain from more knowledge, and more leverage of knowledge by managers dominates the effect of higher wages of workers, and so we get an increase in total wage inequality for all three levels of communication costs. The effect of changes in access to information technology on the number of layers is ambiguous. On one hand, lower costs of acquiring knowledge imply a lower gain from leveraging knowledge and so the value of having multiple layers decreases. On the other hand, the cost of having extra layers, overlapping knowledge, decreases too. The effect of delayering is clear for h = 0.98, in this case we move from an allocation with workers and managers/entrepreneurs and self-employed agents to an allocation with workers only as we decrease t. In this case, improvements in the cost of acquiring information lead to smaller firms. However, for low values of h, the effect of overlapping knowledge dominates and we get an allocation with 3 layers instead of 2 as we decrease t.
One of the interesting features of the model is the effect on wages of increases in managerial span. If a firm has many layers so that the highest layer entrepreneur manages a firm with a large number of workers, she can leverage her knowledge immensely which results in very high earnings. This effect can be appreciated in the numerical exercise for h = 0.7
and t = 1.1. This is the example in which we assume the best access to information and communication technology. The result, as we described above, is an economy with three layers. There are very few entrepreneurs of layer three. As can be observed in Figure 5 , these entrepreneurs do not learn much more than the managers or entrepreneurs of layer two, however, they earn much more. The extend of this increase in wages can be appreciated in Figure 6 , where we have plotted the equilibrium wage functions for all the examples presented above.
Empirical evidence and predictions of the theory
The empirical evidence presented in the introduction finds that in the 80's and early 90's both within and between wage inequality increased. These changes have parallel changes in the organization of the firm. Namely, more decentralization, increases in span of control and less layers of management. According to the exercises presented above, this is only consistent with improvements in the technology to access information. In the numerical exercises, we are able to match qualitatively the results in the empirical literature when communication costs are relatively high and access to information technology improves. As we argued, for high h, decreases in t lead to delayering, which resulted in smaller hierarchies (in terms of number of employees) during this period. In particular, in our numerical example, all firms became one person firms as all workers are self-employed after the technological change.
Notice that we are assuming that hierarchies and firms are equivalent for the purpose of this comparison. This does not have to be the case. However, as long as the determinants of the difference between firms and hierarchies is not changing throughout the period our conclusion applies.
We are also able to qualitatively match the empirical evidence of the mid and late 90's with improvements in communication technology. Decreases in h lead to lower within worker class wage inequality. This effect balances out with higher white collar wage inequality thereby resulting in small effects on total wage inequality (See Figure 3) . Lower h also results in hierarchies with more layers and larger spans of control, which implies larger hierarchies in terms of total number of employees. Our view is that these effects where combined with further decreases in the costs of accessing information thereby dampening the effect of changes in communication technology on wage inequality and firm size. As we pointed out previously, to our knowledge, there are no systematic studies of the reorganization of the workplace for the mid and late 90's to which we could contrast other predictions of the theory for this period. We will therefore offer those as testable implications. Namely, the model and the interpretation so far presented, implies that companies became slightly more centralized in the late 90's, spans of control increased significantly, and the number of layers increased slightly. Since we are assuming that both technologies improved during this recent period, resulting changes that go in opposite directions should be small and changes that go in the same direction should be stronger.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a full fledged equilibrium model of organization and earnings when production requires physical inputs and knowledge and workers are heterogeneous in their cognitive skill. The equilibrium obtained is formed by a universe of knowledge-based hierarchies competing for workers and managers each with different numbers of layers, spans and skill sets. Among the salient features of the equilibrium are positive sorting between workers and managers, an increasing and convex earnings function, the stratification of worker skill into ranks by talent, and the positive relationship between wages and firm size.
The model has allowed us to provide an explanation for the patterns of organizational change and wage inequality described in the introduction. To summarize, the causal mechanism proposed for the 80's and early 90's is as follows. A decrease in the cost of access to stored knowledge leads teams to want to increase the worker's knowledge about tasks and, as a result, allows for an increase in managerial span. This change leads to an increase in the demand for skills which is dampened by the labor market supply of skilled workers. If communication costs are high, these effects lead to a decrease in the number of layers which further enhances the effect on decentralization and reduces firm size. Wage inequality within workers and within managers increases, as the marginal product of skill is proportional to the tasks learned.
Some of these effects where eliminated or reversed in the mid and late 90's by improve-ments in communication technology that lead to larger teams and less wage inequality. As communication technology improves, workers learn less since it is cheaper to ask their managers. these results in small differences in worker wages and therefore less wage inequality.
Managers, in contrast, can deal with more subordinates therefore increasing their spans of control and earnings. Combined with taller hierarchies, these changes result in larger hierarchies or firms.
More broadly, our analysis shows that to understand the determinants of demand for skills and of wage inequality it is necessary to understand the internal structure of teams;
conversely, to understand changes in the internal firm organization it is necessary to incorporate in the analysis labor market outcomes such as the wage structure. For example, the effects of communication technology improvements on the wage structure and on the assignment of workers to jobs can interact with, to the point of nullifying, effects that are unambiguous from a production function standpoint, such as the extent to which tasks are decentralized.
The model has some limitations that should be noted here and, hopefully, will lead to future work. Hierarchies do more than acquire and communicate knowledge, as the literature discussed in the introduction suggests. Future work embedding other models of hierarchy in an equilibrium framework is required in order to gauge the performance of our theory. Future work is also required to empirically test both the longitudinal implications of the model (which, as we saw, follow from an economy wide drop in the cost of IT) and the cross sectional implications concerning the links between firm size, span, layers and wages through the heterogeneity in worker skill. For example, carefully examining, in a matched employee-employer data set like the one used by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) , the relationship between unobservable employee effects and firm organization could provide compelling tests of the validity of our theory.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that both Q l+1 E and Q l E are an internal solution of problem (12). First notice that the elements of the Hessian are given by
which implies that for the problem to be well defined
That is, the price function per worker of a firm must be concave in knowledge. The determinant of the Hessian is given by
where the sign has to be positive since we are maximizing rents.
Using the first order conditions, it is easy to show that
Similarly, the corresponding derivatives with respect to h are given by
Because of the possibility of corner solutions the proposition only holds weakly.¤ Proof of Proposition 2.
Deriving (9) with respect to Q l+1 and solving for the derivative of Q l M with respect Q l+1 , we obtain
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof of this result can be derived directly from the first order condition in (9). Derive that expression with respect to t and h to obtain
Again, both signs follow from
Proof of Proposition 4. Since t and h increase Q l+1 E
and Q l E , we know that the number of workers
increases with t and h. This implies, that every entrepreneur in every firm manages more workers.¤ Proof of Proposition 5. Since employers can hire anyone in the economy, in equilibrium their choice has to be optimal (see Condition (19) in the definition of equilibrium).
That is, for all layers l, if α l is a manager of layer l,
We will prove that the assignment exhibits positive sorting for the case of managers, the proof for the case of entrepreneurs is identical but using R l * (α l , α l−1 ) instead of p l * (α l , α l−1 ).
Derive the first expression with respect to α l−1 to get,
Proof of Proposition 7. First notice that in order for the consultant maximization problem to be well defined we need
Deriving (35) implicitly with respect to α l we obtain that
The sign of f 00 (Q) must be negative for the maximization problem to be well defined. ¤ Proof of Proposition 8. Deriving (35) implicitly with respect to t and h we obtain that
where the last inequality follows from the second order condition of the consultant problem. ¤ Proof of Proposition 9. In the first part of the proof we show that the problem in (7) has the same solution and value as the problem in (29) combined with the problem in (34). For this, let Q l , n l , R l * and w l be an equilibrium allocation according to Definition 1.
Then the problem in (7) can be written as
Notice that in the formulation in Section 3.4 we normalized n = 1. Here we are using a notation that allows for any normalization. In particular, normalize the problem dividing by n 0 and substitute the constraints to get R * (α )h(1 − Q −1 ) = Q − c(α ; t)g(Q )h(1 − Q −1 ) − c(α 0 ; t)g(Q 1 ) − w 0 (α 0 )
But this is equivalent to
which are consistent with (29) and (34). We still need to show that the choices resulting from the two stage maximization in the "Consultants" formulation are the same as the choices in (7). Notice however that combining (31)- (33), (35) and (36) we obtain the following system of first order conditions, c(α 1 ; t)g(Q 1 ) + w 1 (α 1 ) − c(α 0 ; t)g 0 (Q 0 ) = 0,
This system is identical to the system of first order conditions of the problem
which we have shown is equivalent to the problem in (7). Hence the maximization problems in both formulations are equivalent.
We still need to show that all other conditions in both definitions of equilibrium are equivalent. In particular, we need to show that (20) and (38) are equivalent and that (19) is satisfied in the second formulation. The former is trivial given (18) and the result obtained above. For the latter, first apply the Envelope Theorem to (34) to show that ∂R(α; f ) ∂α = −c α g(Q).
Deriving w 0 (α 0 ; f ) with respect to α l then yields
This implies that the equilibrium assignment is optimal for the worker. Hence, an allocation of one formulation is an equilibrium if and only if it is an equilibrium of the other. ¤ Proof of Proposition 10. Fix a maximum number of layers, a vector of thresholds α 00 ≡ (α 00 , α 01 , α 11 , ..., α ) 15 and an initial wage ω > R 0 (0). Given this, we can solve the problems in (8) and (12) (call the solution Q l (α; ω, α 00 )) and obtain wage, rent and assignment functions for all layers using (21), (24), (25) and (23). Let w l (α; ω, α 00 ), R l * (α; ω, α 00 ) and a l * (α; ω, α 00 )) be the calculated wage, rent and assignment function of layer l. Notice that the Theorem of the Maximum ensures that all functions Q l , w l , R l * and a l * are continuous in the initial wage ω, any one threshold α j , j = {00, 01, ..., } , and in α. 
and let α 01 * (ω, α) be the threshold between layer 0 and 1, such that α 01 * (ω, α 11 ) ≡ © α 01 : ES 0 (ω, α 01 ) = 0 ª .
We need to show that α 01 * is well defined, continuous and singled valued. First notice that Hence, by the Mean Value Theorem, α 01 * exists. The function ES 0 may not be monotone and hence there may be several values at which it is equal to zero. On top of this, some of these crossings may disappear or the number of crossings may increase as we change the initial wage ω or any of the thresholds α 01 . However, we know that at least one crossing exists by the argument above, and that there is at least one function α 01 * that is continuous in ω and α 11 . The reason is that ES 0 is continuous in both arguments. Let T be an operator that selects the minimum crossing that is continuous in ω and α 11 , and redefine ES 0 as α 01 * (ω, α 11 ) ≡ T £© α 01 : ES 0 (ω, α 01 ) = 0 ª¤ .
Since we are choosing the minimum continuous crossing, α 01 * is single valued and continuous in both arguments, and by the argument above it exists.
We can proceed sequentially defining functions We still need to check that for the highest ability agents, α = 1, it is better to be entrepreneurs of layer than to become entrepreneurs of layer + 1. Namely,
where the entrepreneurs of layer + 1 would hire managers of layer with ability α −1 * .
If this is the case we have found an equilibrium allocation. If not, is not an equilibrium number of layers.
It remains to show that there exists an equilibrium number of layers . That is, there exist a number of layers for which (41) is satisfied. But notice that
Hence, since c(1; t)g(Q +1 ) > c(1; t)g(Q ),
there exists an such that (41) 
ability stronger. Notice that better ability agents are also assigned to higher ability bosses, who in turn have larger teams by the same propositions and logic. Hence, higher ability agents will manage larger teams and will be employed in larger teams. Proposition (6) then yield the result, since it implies that higher ability agents will also receive larger earnings.
Hence there is a positive relationship between wages and firm size. ¤
